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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

THE ESTATE OF PAUL STEED,
through its administratrix
MARY KAZAN,

R^PLY BRIEF

Plaintiff/Appellant,
-vNEW ESCALANTE IRRIGATION COMPANY,

C^se No. 890426

Defendant/Respondent.

INTRODUCTION
This case

is not

about the

legality of

the defendant

irrigation company's enlargement of irrigated acreage, or whether
it obtained the appropriate change applications for storing water
and changing locations where its water is used, or whether
plaintiff Steed Estate is a lower user on ^he Escalante River, or
whether the Steed Estatef s rights on Alvey Wash were acquired by
adverse use.

Given that the trial court's judgment was based on

its legal conclusion that the irrigation company was not liable
for any loss suffered by the Steed Estate and that it did not
reach the question as to the amount of the Steed Estate's loss,
the issue on appeal does not involve issues that the irrigation
company talks about. This case presents an overriding legal issue
and is about technology and the rights of water users in the same
river basin when the implementation of technology by one user
adversely affects another.

In support of its position, the irrigation company advocates
the mechanical application of broadly stated rules of law from old
cases that are factually and legally distinguishable from this
case.

The irrigation company's opposing brief is marked by

dogmatic reliance upon the language of inapposite cases and a
general disregard of the rationale of modern cases and policiesthat must be considered in applying old rules to new cases.
Nowhere does the irrigation company offer any policy justification
for the rule it would have apply to this case.

The irrigation

company wants all of the rights of a water user without accepting
any of the responsibilities that go with those rights.
I
A Lower User on the Same River System Is
Entitled to Protection Whether He Diverts
From the Same Stream or a Contributing Stream
A,

The rationale in East Bench applies as well to users on
different streams as it does to users on the same stream.
The irrigation company attempts to distinguish East Bench

Irrigation Co. v. Deseret Irrigation Co., 2 Utah 2d 170, 271 P.2d
449 (1954), from this case, arguing that in East Bench the lower
user was diverting from the same stream as the upper user, where,
as in this case, the Steed Estate is diverting from a different
stream (Alvey Wash) than the irrigation company (Escalante River).
The irrigation company argues that this distinction is legally
significant because the court in East Bench distinguished the old
waste water cases in part on the basis that they did not involve
upper and lower users on the same stream.
2

The distinguishing

language relied on by the irrigation company in its opposing brief
goes well beyond the holding in East Bench,

It is dicta, and as

such it is not binding on this Court. That it is merely dicta is
important, because the court there was not speaking on the basis
of facts such as are before this Court anc^ the general dicta was
not directed to a specific set of controlling facts.

Nor is the

dicta persuasive.

Neither the court in East Bench nor the

irrigation

offer

company

any

hydrological

reason or policy

justification for drawing such a distinction.
The language in East Bench quoted by the irrigation company
can best be explained as an effort by the court to, quite
understandably, limit its holding to the facts at hand.

After

all, by its holding, the court in East Bench was rejecting a broad
rule previously stated many times in earlier cases.

A case-by-

case approach is in harmony with the apprqach taken by the court
in Crocket v. Jones, 277 P. 550 (Idaho 1929), cited approvingly by
the court in East Bench in support of its hblding. In Crocket, it
is wisely noted that "The right to change the place of diversion
and use of water depends upon and must be controlled by the facts
of each particular case, and no inflexible rule applicable to all
situations can be laid down."

Id. at 552.

It is the rationale of East Bench and ijiot its dicta that must
define the scope of the rule announced.

The decision in East

Bench is based primarily on the court's recognition of two basic
hydrological facts: (1) that much of the irrigation water used in
a river basin finds its way back into the "river system" and is
3

used "over and over" for irrigation, and (2) that changes in place
or manner of use by one user on a river system

can have

substantial effects on the water available for diversion by other
users.

271 P.2d at 452, 454.

These hydrological facts apply

equally to upper and lower users on the same river system, whether
the upper and lower users divert from the same stream or different
streams in the river system.

Likewise, the court's conclusions

that the lower users in East Bench ought to be able to rely on
existing stream conditions and that upper users ought not to be
able to increase the amount of water consumed by a change in
manner of use to the injury of lower users apply equally to all
streams in a river system.

Given the rationale of the East Bench

case, there is no basis for drawing a legal distinction between
the rights of upper and lower users on the same stream and upper
and lower users on different streams in the same river system.
The lack of any principled reason for distinguishing between these
situations is shown by the following example.
Imagine a farm located at the place where Alvey Wash joins
the Escalante River.

Assume that the farm is irrigated by water

from Alvey Wash in the same amounts as have been diverted by the
Steed

Estate

from Alvey

Wash.

Assume

the water

for this

hypothetical farm is diverted from Alvey Wash at a point of
diversion located five feet above where Alvey Wash joins the
Escalante River. Now imagine the same farm with the same quantity
of diversions; but this time the water formerly diverted from
Alvey Wash is diverted after it flows into the Escalante River
4

from a point of diversion on the Escalante River five feet below
where Alvey Wash joins the Escalante B\±VBTO

The irrigation

company would draw a legal distinction between the water rights of
the farm owner in these two hypothetical Situations based on the
location of the point of diversion. The irrigation company would
say that under East Bench the diversions fjrom the Escalante River
would be entitled to protection against lo$ses resulting from the
irrigation company's change in the manned and place of use but
that the diversions directly from Alvey Wash would not.

Why

should ten feet make a difference in the Legal rule applicable?
Ten feet does not change either the hydrological facts or water
policy.

Thus, the protection against changes in manner and place

of use granted in East Bench must be extended to all users on the
same river system, and in this case to the Steed Estate.
In East Bench, the court moved away from old cases that
relied on labels like "waste water" to det0rmine water rights and
moved to determining rights based on hydrological facts and .water
policy. There should be and can be no goin^ back to the old ways.
The rationale adopted by the court in Eastfienchis so contrary to
the wooden approach used in earlier cases "qhat those cases are no
longer authoritative.

As the court ir Mannix

Thresher, 95 Mont. 267, 26 P.2d 373 (1933

& Wilson v.

held, a lower user's

right to return flows transported from on< stream to another in
the same river system as a result of an uppetr user's appropriation
is entitled to protection against changes in the upper user's
manner of use. The other cases and authorities relied upon by the
5

irrigation

company

are

factually

inapposite,

having

been

superseded by the subsequent holdings in East Bench, Stubbs v.
Ercanbrack, 13 Utah 2d 45, 368 P.2d 461 (1962), and the other
later cases cited in appellant's opening brief.
B.

The authorities relied upon by the irrigation company have
been superseded and are factually distinguishable.
In quoting from Hutchins' 1942 publication, Selected Problems

in the Law of Water Rights in the West (page 16 of the irrigation
company's brief), the irrigation company relies on old law.
his multi-volume

treatise

published

between

1971

In

and 1977,

Hut chins, in summarizing Utah law, acknowledges that the early
Utah cases, relied upon here by the irrigation company, indicate
that

as between

two

adjoining

tracts of

land

there

is no

obligation of the upper tract to continue to supply the lower
tract.

The law is different as to water that is permitted to

return to a natural course.

Acknowledging the existence of the

old cases, relied on by the irrigation company, Hutchins comments
in his later work:
However, any part of the water used on the original
appropriator?s land that seeps therefrom back into the
main channel loses its identity and becomes a part of
the natural flow therein. The same loss of identity
occurs when water used for irrigation becomes commingled
with the waters of the ground water table.
2 W. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States
578 (1974) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Hutchins then summarizes Utah law:
Once waste and seepage waters pass from the control of
the original appropriator, return to the natural channel
and become a part of the supply for downstream users,
6

the landowner cannot, by an application for change,
change his point of diversion,, place or manner of use if
it interferes with the rights of a downstream user. An
appropriator is entitled to rely on stream conditions
remaining substantially as they were when he made his
appropriation.
Id. at 579 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
The treatise cited by the irrigation company as Weil on Water
Rights (more properly Water Rights in the Western States) and
relied upon by the irrigation company at page 17 of its brief is
a

1911 treatise

controlling

that was written prior

later

developments

in

the

to substantial

law.

Even

and

so, the

quotations from Weil are factually misapplied because the author's
comments are directed primarily to "waste water in a ditch or
soaking from one land to another."

Hetie we deal with water

returned to a natural water course which is part of the same
natural river system.

More importantly, the law in Utah is

settled that water that has been permitted to return to a natural
course, even so-called waste water, is subject to appropriation.
McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 242 P.2d 570, 571 (1952),
Stubbs v. Ercanbrack, 368 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1962).

Also, Weil

acknowledges that "a subsequent appropriator has a vested right as
against

his

senior

to

insist

upon

the

continuance

of

the

conditions that existed at the time he mad« his appropriation."
1 S. Weil, Water Rights in the Western States 314 (3rd Ed. 1911).
Because such heavy reliance is plaqed by the irrigation
company on the older Utah cases and cases which are factually
inapposite, it may be well to briefly canvap some of those cases.
7

McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 242 P.2d 570 (1952), is
cited for the proposition that a subsequent appropriator cannot
require a prior appropriator to continue to waste water and that
the prior appropriator can recapture and beneficially use waste
water if he does so before it gets beyond his property and
control.

Dicta from McNaughton to that effect is quoted on page

19 of the irrigation company's brief.

Of course, East Bench, by

holding otherwise on these issues, distinguishes the dicta quoted.
More importantly, the actual holding in McNaughton supports the
Steed Estate's position.
In McNaughton, the trial court held that the defendants had
no right to appropriate the subject waters from the flows in the
gulch which were comprised of (1) natural flows, (2) surplus and
waste water, (3) water draining into the gulch from irrigated
lands adjacent to the gulch, (4) plaintiffs' irrigation water
historically recaptured by plaintiffs, and (5) canal waters turned
into the gulch to be used to irrigate plaintiffs' land. The trial
court also held that plaintiffs' rights to these waters were not
subject to any control or limited to any beneficial use.

The

issue on appeal was the defendants' contentions that the waters
involved were public waters subject to appropriation and that the
plaintiffs' right to use those waters was limited to the amount
required to satisfy the reasonable and efficient beneficial use in
accordance with plaintiffs' prior appropriation. McNaughton, 242
P.2d at 571.

The Court noted that:

8

If these are public waters defendants, as junior
appropriators, are entitled to the use of all waters not
required to satisfy all prior rights under reasonably
efficient use*
Id. at 571.
In reversing the trial court, it was held tihat the defendants had
appropriated the waters flowing down the qiilch and, to the extent
plaintiffs had not used the water beneficially under their prior
right of appropriation, defendants were entitled to the excess.1
The Court said:
The trial court correctly held that plaintiffs have the
prior right to use all of these waters, because as to
the first three divisions they have first appropriated
them to a beneficial use before 1903 when no application
to appropriate was necessary, but the court erred in
holding that the plaintiffs1 rights to the use of these
waters are not subject to reasonable regulation and
control in the interest of saving walfer. It is clear
that all of these waters are subject to appropriation
and the only right that can be acquired to their use is
a reasonably efficient beneficial use, and defendants as
subsequent appropriators are entitled to the use of all
of such waters not necessary to satisfy such
requirements of plaintiffs.
Id. at 575.
While McNaughton holds that the subsequent appropriator is subject
to the appropriation of prior appropriators to the extent water
has been beneficially used in accordance with those appropriatorsT
prior rights, it does not hold that the prior appropriator may
expand his beneficial use beyond his original use to the detriment
x

It was held that those waters vjhich plaintiffs had
historically captured and which plaintiffs l>ad put in the gulch to
irrigate their own land could not be appropriated since they never
had left plaintiffs* possession. These waters could not have
flowed to defendants at the time of their appropriation.
9

of subsequent appropriators.

Indeed, the import of the case is

directly to the contrary.
The defendants in East Bench, like the irrigation company
here, also relied upon Lasson v. Seely, 120 Utah 679, 238 P. 2d 418
(1951), as support for their claim that they had the right to
change the manner of their use and thereafter fully consume all
the water which they diverted onto their lands by using it over
and over again so long as they made use of it before it got off
their land and out of their control.

East Bench rejected this

reading of the Lasson case, distinguishing Lasson on several
alternative grounds, including that Lasson "did not involve a
change of place of diversion or place or manner of use."

East

Bench, 271 P.2d at 456.
While acknowledging the earlier "waste water" cases, Stubbs
v. Ercanbrack, 13 Utah 2d 45, 368 P.2d 461 (1962), relied upon by
the irrigation company, confirms that we do not here deal with
"waste water" concepts and mandates the reversal of the decision
here appealed and requires the granting of the very relief the
Steeds here seek.

Although cited by the irrigation company,

Stubbs is directly contrary to the position advocated by the
irrigation company.

In Stubbs, plaintiffs had for many years

collected water in drains on their property and used the water to
irrigate their lands.

The water plaintiffs collected in their

drains resulted both from the flow of irrigation water from
defendants adjacent ground and from water in the underlying water
table.

Defendant later installed a closed drainage system to
10

lower the water table on his land and to collect the drainage
waters so that they could be pumped and used for irrigation in a
sprinkler

irrigation

installation

of

a

system.
closed

As

drainage

a

result
system,

of
the

defendant's
flow

from

defendant's ground stopped, the underground water table was
drained, and plaintiffs' drains dried up,

Plaintiffs sued for

damages and an injunction preventing defendant from interfering
with their water rights.

On appeal, the issue was "whether the

plaintiffs have the right to the use of w^ter to which they had
established prior rights . . . or whether the defendant in putting
in his drainage system . . . has the right to use the water
developed therefrom."

Id. at 463. The court first affirmed that

"when rights to . . . use have been established in accordance with
law, they must be safeguarded."

Id.

In response to defendant's

contention that the water involved was waste water in which
plaintiffs' could acquire no rights, the Court said:
The answer to the contention is that the waters produced
in these [plaintiffs'] drains are noit waste waters as
referred to in the usual sense . . . .| [T]hey resulted
both from the irrigation of the defendant's higher
ground and from the underlying watet table. We are
quite in harmony with the idea that w^ter rights could
not be acquired in waste water so that defendant would
be obligated to continue to irrigate his higher ground
to provide water to be collected in the plaintiffs'
drains. But after irrigation water is used and becomes
commingled with waters in the natural water table, it
has lost its identity as irrigation water and is no
longer owned by defendant as such. Such waters in the
natural water table are and always have been subject to
appropriation. . . . [T]o whatever extent plaintiff
[sic] had lawfully established prior rights to the use
of water from these sources, their ridhts are entitled
to protection and defendant may not encroach thereon and
usurp their water . . . .
11

:id. at 463-464.
The case was remanded for determination of the amount of water
lost by plaintiffs and for entry of a decree precluding defendant
from diminishing the flow to plaintiffs.
In this case, the Steed Estate's water rights are established
by a duly issued certificate of appropriation and by court decree.
At the time that appropriation was acquired, Alvey Wash users
depended

upon

impaired.

flow

from

springs

and

seepage, which

is now

Also at the time the appropriation was made, the

irrigation company's return flow augmented the flow of Alvey Wash.
None of the pre-East Bench cases involve such a situation.
general

rule

in East Bench, Stubbs, and Piute

The

Reservoir

&

Irrigation Co. v. West Panguitch Irrigation & Reservoir Co., 12
Utah 2d 168, 364 P.2d 113 (1961) applies. These cases, being the
most recent, are controlling.
II
Losses to the Steeds Must Be Made Up
Regardless of the Sources Used to Make Up the Loss
The irrigation company complains that if it is required to
make up the losses that have resulted to the Steed Estate from the
irrigation company's change to a sprinkler irrigation system, it
will be required to artificially divert water from the Escalante
River to the Steed Estate on Alvey Wash.2
2

The irrigation company

It is significant in this regard that plaintiff's 60 acres
irrigated with Alvey Wash water are included in the 2712.28 acres
defendant claims it is entitled to irrigate with Escalante River
water. Exhibit 10; Exhibit 110.
12

claims that because of this, it is somehow relieved of its
responsibility for the consequence of its voluntary conduct. But
the principle established in East Bench does not permit the
irrigation company to avoid so easily the Responsibility for the
adverse consequence of its change in manned of use and resulting
increase in its consumption of water.

Moreover, as noted below,

making up this loss does not require the diversion of any more
water from the Escalante but merely requites that a very small
portion of the water saved by the new technology be allocated to
protection of existing Alvey Wash rights.
When

the

irrigation

company

began

irrigating

from

the

Escalante River in 1875, it artificially affected the flow of
water in the Escalante River basin, shifting water from the
Escalante River to Alvey Wash, a tributary -^o the Escalante River
and part of the same river system. As a necessary consequence of
the best methods of irrigation then available (flood irrigation),
the flow in Alvey Wash was increased.

Consistent with the water

policy of this State, which dictates the efficient use of water,
the Steed Estate's predecessors-in-interest and other land owners
on Alvey Wash appropriated the augmented flpws in Alvey Wash for
irrigation purposes.

This placed to beneficial use the seepage

and return flows to the river system naturally resulting from the
irrigation company's irrigation methods.
In exchange for the right the law ga^e to the irrigation
company to divert water from the Escalante River, with the
resulting changes in the patterns and paths jsf the return of that
13

water to the Escalante River, the law imposed certain obligations
consistent with promoting the beneficial use of water.

Having

undertaken to use the water diverted in a certain manner, the
irrigation company assumed liability for any injuries to lower
users in the same river basin as a result of later changes in
manner of use, particularly any changes that resulted in increases
in

the

consumption

of

water.

In

accordance

with

the

responsibility imposed, the irrigation company must make up the
loss that has resulted from its change in manner of use regardless
of whether it must divert water from the Escalante River to do so.
Otherwise, the equilibrium the law seeks to maintain between upper
and lower users in the same river system--in this case one that
has existed for 75 to 100 years—will be significantly disrupted.
The Steed Estate does not seek to compel the irrigation
company to continue to divert water from the Escalante River or to
compel the irrigation company to use any particular method of
irrigation. All the Steed Estate seeks is to have the irrigation
company accept the responsibility for the losses the Steed Estate
has suffered as a result of the irrigation company's voluntary
change in the manner the water is used.

The irrigation company

is, accordingly, free to implement any water-saving technology it
desires to use and have the benefits of that technology to the
extent the benefits to the irrigation company are not merely the
result of the use of technology to shift the water used by the
Steed Estate to the irrigation company.

To the extent the

technology does this, it is not water-saving technology but merely
14

water-shifting technology, which does not increase the beneficial
use of water or encourage conservation„
III
The Steed Estate's Rights, Whether by Appropriation or
Adverse Use, Were Vested at the Time of First Appropriation
and Were Confirmed in the Adjudication Proceedings
The

irrigation

company

argues

tliat

for

purposes

of

determining whether it is required to maKe up losses resulting
from its change in manner of use a distinction should be drawn
between the Steed Estatef s water rights vfhich are based upon a
certificate of appropriation and those basjed on adverse use.

In

response, it must first be noted that the Steed's water user
claims were not obtained by exercise of an^ rights adverse to the
irrigation company.
and vested.

Secondly, those rights are fully adjudicated

Finally, and perhaps most important, there is no

hydrological or policy justification foi the distinction the
irrigation company wishes to elevate to le^al significance.
The Steed's adjudicated water user claims were acquired as a
matter of adversity only as to other user^ on Alvey Wash.

They

are not based on adversity as to the irrigation company.

When

that water was placed to beneficial use ov^r three-quarters of a
century ago, there was no contention by ^he irrigation company
that that use was adverse to it.

There is no record of any

protest that the water was not subject to 4pPr°Pria"tion or could
not be placed to beneficial use.

The matter of adversity arose

only as to a matter of priority of right^ as between users on
Alvey Wash. No one would seriously contend that the water should
15

have been left unused, to end up in the Colorado.

Nor did the

irrigation company raise any issue of adversity years later in the
general adjudication proceeding, where the water was adjudicated
to the Steeds.

Pretrial Order dated July 27, 1977, Exhibit 77.

That an issue was presented in that proceeding as to priority
between the users on Alvey Wash is of no consequence to the
irrigation company here.
The Steed Estate's water rights based on adverse use were
vested in 1915 and 1917, according to the Approved Proposed
Determination.
and 1440.

Exhibit 10, page 207, Water User Claim Nos. 1272

By the Pretrial Order in this case, the irrigation

company stipulated that plaintiff's water rights were as set forth
in the Approved Proposed Determination.

(R. 93, II.F.,

page 5.)

The Approved Proposed Determination recognizes and adjudicates the
validity of the Steed Estate's rights acquired by adverse use, the
same as it does the Steed Estate's rights acquired by certificate
of appropriation.
How the Steed Estate's rights were acquired is not relevant
to the reconciliation of the competing interests involved here.
The significant thing for purposes of resolving the issue here is
that the return flows were appropriated and that the appropriation
is recognized by a court of law as having been lawfully made.
Once recognized as having been lawfully made, the Steed Estate's
rights to appropriate from Alvey Wash became vested for all
purposes. This is particularly so under the circumstances of this
case, since the validity of the Steed Estate's rights to divert
16

from

Alvey

Wash

were

judicially

determined

in

a

statutory

adjudication proceeding to which the irrigation company, as a
water user in the Escaiante Basin, was a Jparty*

The irrigation

company's attempt to make something of the existence of a protest
by other persons left unanswered in that proceeding now twelve
Years over is but a misplaced afterthought^.3
Moreover, this argument of the irrig^-cion company falls of
its own weight, being based on an erroneous assumption that the
water is "waste water."

This water was not "waste water" and was

subject to appropriation•

East Bench, Stupbs, supra.

Finally, the irrigation company attaches mo^e significance to
the basis of the Steed Estatefs right than do the cases cited by
the irrigation company*

Whether the lower User's right was based

on an appropriation or adverse use was q>f no significance in
either Garns v. Rollins, 41 Utah 260, 125 p. 867 (1912), or East
Bench.

The language in Garns states expressly that the result

would be the same whether the lower user's right was based on
"appropriation, prescription [adverse use], or astoppel."

Id., at

872.

The court in Garns was not prepared to admit that a lower

user

had

any

rights

in

waste

3

or

retiirn

water

under

any

At the time the order approving the Proposed Determination
was entered, some Alvey Wash users protested the Steed Estatefs
claims based on adverse use.
But in light of the parties'
stipulation in the pretrial order in this case that the Steed
Estate's rights are as set forth in the prjoposed determination,
the protest raises no issue here.
In Addition, because the
protestors have not pressed their protest ^t any time during the
last thirteen years, the protest has beer effectively, if not
technically, waived.
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circumstances.

The court in East Bench has, however, upheld a

lower user's rights to waste or return water based primarily on
its recognition that changes by one user on a river system can
have effect on the rights of other users. Though East Bench does
not appear to involve any claim based on adverse use, in its
articulation of the rule it was applying the court made no
distinction between the basis of the lower usersf water right and
their right to be protected from the adverse effects of changes by
upper users.

The court said:

The upper users cannot by a change in place of diversion
or by a change in place or nature of use consume more
water than would have been consumed without the change
and thereby deprive the lower users of their right to
use such water without impairing the vested rights of
such lower users.
271 P.2d at 454.
The irrigation company's argument that an adjudicated claim
based on adverse use should be treated differently is nothing more
than a variation of its argument that the rule in the old waste
water cases, rather than the rule in East Bench and Stubbs, should
control in this instance.

The rationale and rule in the later

cases applies equally to adjudicated water rights based on adverse
use as to water rights based on appropriation.
IV
This Case Does Not Depend on the Requirement
To File a Change Application
The failure of the irrigation company to file a change
application

is

relevant

here

only

allocation of the burden of proof.
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because

it

affects

the

Because it was required to

file a change application, the burden of proving that the change
affects the Steed Estate's rights

(normally resting

plaintiff) shifts to the irrigation company.

on the

Piute Reservoir &

Irrigation Co. v. West Panguitch Irrigation & Reservoir Co., 12
Utah 168, 364 P.2d 113, 116 (1961).

The scope of the statutory

provisions requiring change applications (§§ 73-3-3(3), (4), (5),
73-3-6, 73-3-7, Utah Code Annotated) in no way limits the Court's
ability and duty to protect one user from the adverse effects of
change in use made by another.

It would be inappropriate to

construe a remedial statute obviously intended to regulate changes
that might affect the rights of others as restricting in any way
the scope of protection otherwise available.

The intent of the

legislature in adopting this statute was siirely to expand and not
limit the protection available.
The language in East Bench recognizees the court's duty to
provide broad protection to lower user^.

The court stated

repeatedly that changes in "nature" and "|manner" and "place of
use, " as well as changes in place of diversion, cannot be made
without protecting the lower users from the effects of these
expansive categories of changes.

271 P.2dj at 453.

So, even if

the irrigation company were not required to submit a change
application, it would still be liable for the injury caused to
others as a result of its change in manner and place of use.
In addition, because of the remedial purposes of the change
application procedure, the statute should b4 broadly construed to
permit regulation of changes that potentially affect other users.
19

"Remedial statutes are liberally construed to suppress the evil
and advance the remedy."
60.01.

3 Sutherland Statutory Construction, §

The procedure applies to changes in "point of diversion,

place or purpose of use." § 73-3-3(3), Utah Code Annotated.

The

statute can readily be construed to include a change in use from
the "purpose" of flood irrigation to the "purpose" of sprinkler
irrigation.

And, as noted above, this Court has used expansive

language ("nature" and "manner" of use) in applying this statute.
In an attempt to avoid the impact of this statute, the
irrigation

company

cites

a number of

cases to

support the

proposition that the irrigation company's shareholders can change
the place where they use irrigation company water without filing
a change application.

The cases cited all involve disputes

between irrigation companies and shareholders that wished to
change either their point of diversion or place of use. This fact
is central to the rationale for the rule.
is

reasoned

that

since

no

one

would

In the cases cited, it
be

affected

by

the

shareholder's change in use except other shareholders, the change
is merely a matter of internal management of the irrigation
company.

Under those circumstances, it was felt that no change

application should be required.

See Syrett v. Tropic & East Fork

Irr. Co.,97 Utah 56, 89 P.2d 474 (1939); Arnold v. C. & R. Ass'n,
64 Utah 534, 231 P. 622, 623-624 (1924); Baird v. Upper Canal
Irrigation Co., 70 Utah 57, 257 P. 1060, 1065 (1927) (the court
noted that the shareholder can use, lease, or otherwise dispose of
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the water only "so long as the rights of others are not interfered
with").
The cases cited do not address and failed to foresee a
situation like that presented here, where the change in manner of
use has an adverse effect on a nonshareholper's rights. Had they
foreseen such a situation, one can hardly suppose the court would
have permitted the change in use that ^ould cause injury to
another

user

without

complying

with

the

change

application

procedure specifically designed to protect affected users.

The

rationale for the rule in these cases will not permit the rule to
be

applied

here,

where

the

dispute

.nvolves

the

effects

shareholder changes in place of use on a lonshareholder's water
right.4
With respect to the irrigation company's assertion that the
Court should defer to the State Engineer's knparent interpretation
of the statutory provisions relating to change applications, it
must be remembered that this Court is the ultimate interpreter of
statutes.

It would also be inappropriate bo rely on the content

of the State Engineer's change application forms or procedures in
a case of apparent first impression.

Theire is no evidence that

the State Engineer has considered a situation like this in either
interpreting the change application statute or the preparation of
forms or instructions. An oversight or failure to anticipate all
4

Plaintiff does own shares of stock in defendant (R. 440;
T.87), but the water rights involved in this suit are not derived
through stock ownership.
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possible effects of certain types of changes in use by the State
Engineer is not persuasive.

But if the irrigation company

advances this theory, it must accept the full ramifications of the
theory, including the statement in Exhibit 29 made by the State
Engineer's representative in Cedar City, who has been in charge of
administering water matters in this district for several decades,
that "It is known that when the New Escalante Irrigation Co. went
to sprinkler system that it diminished the reflow into Alvey Wash
and based on this premise it might be understood that the flow
from Alvey Wash must now be further supplemented from irrigation
company shares." Exhibit 29 was erroneously excluded by the trial
court, but the irrigation company cannot in one breath say that
statements of the State Engineer's office cannot be admitted at
trial but afterwards claim that other statements by the State
Engineer's office should be considered.
V
There Is Sufficient Water to Make Up Losses
to Downstream Users and Still
Expand Irrigation Company Use
No one needs to lose in this case.

The savings in water

consumed by the use of the new technology enables the downstream
users to be fully protected while still providing very substantial
increase in water available to the irrigation company.

It is not

contended that the irrigation company's change to a sprinkler
system has increased the amount of water available for diversion
from the Escalante River, or that the irrigation company does not
use all the water it is entitled to divert (and perhaps then
22

some), or that the irrigation company has or has ever had all of
the water it can use in the late summer.

But it is undisputed

that the irrigation company's use of a pressurized sprinkler
irrigation system has reduced the amount o^ water returning to the
river

system

through Alvey Wash, thereby making more water

available for effective application to cr^ps.
number of

As a result, the

acres that can be

irrigated

with

the

irrigation

company's water has increased.

In short

with the pressurized

sprinkler irrigation system, more acres ca^i now be irrigated with
the same amount of water.

Some of the w^ter now available for

irrigation previously returned to the rivefr system through Alvey
Wash, where it was diverted by the Steed Estate.
The reason the irrigation company is ^till short of water in
the late summer since installation of the pressurized sprinkler
irrigation system is because the water is being used to irrigate
more acreage at one time than ever before. Between an additional
600 to 900 acres are being irrigated now ovbr that which could be
irrigated by flood irrigation based on the years for which
evidence is available. (See page 19 of the Steed Estate's Opening
Brief.) It is not surprising, then, that evjen after the sprinkler
system was installed the irrigation compan^ is short of water in
late summer. Only now it is short of water to irrigate over 2700
acres instead of short of water to irrigate 2000 or fewer acres
irrigated in the past. Fortunately, under the facts of this case,
the irrigation company can replace the loss suffered by the Steed
Estate and all other users on Alvey Wash anc still irrigate nearly
23

20% more acreage than it had been able to irrigate before it
changed to a pressurized sprinkler irrigation system.5

(See the

Steed Estate's opening brief, p. 28.)
CONCLUSION
Under the rationale of the East Bench case, there is no
principled way to distinguish between the rights of lower users on
the same stream and lower users on different streams in the same
river basin.

In both situations the lower user is entitled to be

protected from losses suffered to it as a result of change in the
upper user's manner of water use.

The statements from the cases

relied upon by the irrigation company in support of its position
are inconsistent with the holding and rationale of later cases.
The Steed Estate's water rights are vested
protection.

and entitled to

If an irrigation company can be permitted to ignore

these rights, "then water rights become tenuous indeed, if not
quite meaningless."

Stubbs v. Ercanbrack, 368 P.2d at 463. The

irrigation company should be required to make up the Steed
Estate's losses.

Even then, it will be able to irrigate more

acreage than ever before.

5

At pages 13-14 of the irrigation company's brief, it states
that the Steed Estate was irrigating between 15 and 30 acres with
water obtained through the purchase of rental stock from the
irrigation company. This is incorrect. Those figures are for the
acreage being irrigated with the water available from Alvey Wash
during the years mentioned.
(R. 442; T.89.) The Steeds have
watered about 75 acres with the water represented by their stock
in the irrigation company. (R. 440; T.87.)
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